PAUSANIAS’ ACTIONS IN BYZANTION AFTER THE VICTORY AT PLATAEA: A RECONSIDERATION

(478-469 B.C.)

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ABSTRACT

The Allied Greek fleet captured Byzantion in 478 B.C under the command of Spartan general Pausanias. Thucydides and the ancient historians following him state that the leadership of the Greek Alliance was transferred to Athens in Byzantion because of the facts that Pausanias not only behaved the Athenians and the other allies insolently but also collaborated with the Persians and imitated their customs. However, in this study, we shall put forward that the Athenians and the other allies used Pausanias’ s reactive behaviour against themselves as a pretext to take the leadership away from the Spartans. In fact, it is likely that the signs of ongoing struggle to hold the leadership of Hellas between Athens and Sparta reached a critical level in Byzantion, so the Athenians and the other allies used force to achieve this leadership. Therefore, the assumptions that Pausanias may have been compelled to collaborate with the Persians and thus he was able to rule in Byzantion for seven years (476-469 B.C ) owing to the support of Persians strengthen. Within this context, it could be said that, after the early 460 s, Sparta entered into an open conflict against Athens over the control of Byzantion.

Pausanias, nephew of the Spartan King Leonidas, regent for his son, Pleistarchos, was the victorious Spartan general at Plataea (479 B.C ) in the Persian Wars. After the final victory over Persians, the allied Greek fleet launched its operations under the command of Pausanias in summer of 478

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2Herodotus, IX.10.2; 10.60 ff.; Thucydides, L.130.1; Plutarch, Aristides, 17 ff; Diodorus, XI.44.1; 46.2.
B.C. He first captured part of the island of Cyprus and then Byzantion.\(^3\) Thucydides (460-400 B.C.) gives us the earliest detailed account of Pausanias’ actions in Byzantion as well as in Sparta as a digression in his work when the Athenians, just before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War demand the Spartans to remove a curse concerning him.\(^4\) After taking the command in Byzantion, Pausanias sends a letter to the Persian King, Xerxes as follows:

‘Pausanias, the general of Sparta anxious to do you a favor, sends you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with your approval, to marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. I may say that I think I am able to do this, with your co-operation. Accordingly if any of this pleases you, send a safe man to the sea through whom we may in future conduct our correspondence.’\(^5\)

Xerxes was pleased with this letter and replied that he would support Pausanias the best he could. Upon this:

Pausanias became prouder than ever, and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantion in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was quite unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander scale. He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so violent a temper to every one without exception that no one could come near him. Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy went over to the Athenians.\(^6\)

As seen in the above-quoted text, Thucydides claims that the tyrannical or monarchical conduct of Pausanias against the Athenians and the other allies in Byzantion constituted the principal reason for the split within the alliance.

Considering that someone, who was the regent king of Spartans and played a significant role in defeating the Persians at Plataea, could not easily have shown a reaction against the other allies in Byzantion, the truth in this official statement of Thucydides needs to be questioned. We propose that there should have been some underlying reasons for Pausanias’s reaction against the other allies in Byzantion and his eventual collaboration with the Persians, which Thucydides does not or needs to state. Since the modern authors do not appear

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\(^3\) Thucydides, I.94; Diodorus, XI.44.2.
\(^4\) Thucydides, I.128-134.
\(^5\) Thucydides, I.128.6.
\(^6\) Thucydides, I.130.1-2. Later ancient writers follow Thucydides in their observations concerning Pausanias’ arrogance, insolence against the other allies in Byzantion and his imitation of the Persian customs. They similarly state that the allies took side of Athenians because of Pausanias’ treatment with arrogance, harshness, contempt and ill-temper. See Diodorus, XI.44.3-6; Plutarch, Aristides, 23.3-4; Cimon, 6.3; Nepos, Pausanias, 3.1-3; Athenaeus, XII.50, p.536ab. The last two writers only mention his arrogance and imitation of Persian customs. Actually Nepos appears to have used Thucydides as his main source on the life of Pausanias, as he quotes from him. Pausanias, 2.3-5. Both Lycurgus and Demosthenes, fourth century Athenian orators, were also aware of the conduct of Pausanias. Lycurgus, Speech I, section 128 [Against Leocrates]; Demosthenes, Speech LXIX, section 96 [Apollodorus Against Neaera].
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to be concentrating on this issue while telling the actions of Pausanias, in this paper, we shall strive to explain these reasons.

In the autumn of 481 B.C. and again in the spring of 480 B.C., many Greek states met at the Isthmus of Corinth to set aside their quarrels and create a league to stop Persian advance towards Greece by Xerxes and eventually to defeat him. At the meetings of the new alliance, consisting of only thirty-one of the many Greek states, it was agreed that Sparta should assume overall command both on land and sea by the firm insistence of allies, although Athens’s contribution of the largest navy might have entitled them to the command of the fleet. With regard to this matter, Herodotus states as follows:

In the first days, before the sending to Sicily for alliance, there had been talk of entrusting the command at sea to the Athenians. However, when the allies resisted, the Athenians waived their claim, considering the safety of Hellas of prime importance and seeing that if they quarreled over the leadership, Hellas must perish. In this they judged rightly, for civil strife is as much worse than united war as war is worse than peace. Knowing that, they gave ground and waived their claim, but only so long as they had great need of the others. This is clear, for when they had driven the Persian back and the battle was no longer for their territory but for his, they made a pretext of Pausanias’ highhandedness and took the command away from the Lacedaemonians. All that, however, took place later.

What concerns us in the above-mentioned text is that the Athenians offered the *hybris* of Pausanias as a pretext (*prophasin tén Pausanieô hubrin*) when they took away the Spartan hegemony in Byzantion. Even if a pro-Athenian writer like Herodotus accepts that, when the Athenians were no longer in need of the other, that is, the Spartans and her allies, they took the occasion of Pausanias’s *hybris* to use for their own benefit, there is more likely

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8 Herodotus, VIII.2.3. In fact, the decision of choosing Sparta was not surprising in view of the large number of the Peloponnesian states which were present at the meeting.

9 Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 7.5.

10 Herodotus, VIII.3.1-2. Also see Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 7.6. Plutarch states that Themistokles “soothed the Athenians’ pride by promising them that if they proved their valour in the fighting, he would guarantee that the rest of the Greeks would accept their leadership later on.”

to be a truth in his observation. Therefore, the preliminary causes of Pausanias’ action and the circumstances which had so disposed him need to be highlighted.

We think that Thucydides’s mental disposition on Pausanias’ insolent attitude against the other allies in Byzantion seems to be misleading to understand the real issue of power struggle over the control of Byzantion between the two leading powers, which appears to have lasted longer. The changing behavior of Pausanias against the other allies in Byzantion should primarily be evaluated from a general point of the power struggle going on between the two leading powers, Athens and Sparta, in Hellas.

As also mentioned in the above-quoted text of Herodotus, it appears that the signs of dispute between Sparta and Athens over the leadership of Hellas was already there during the invasion of Hellas by Xerxes, and this phenomenon continued to exist immediately after the Greek victory at Mycale.

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12 In another passage, Herodotus (V.32.1) states that it was newly appointed Persian general Megabates “whose daughter, if indeed the tale is true [ei dé alēthēs ge esti ho logos], Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, son of Cleombrotus, at a later day betrothed to himself, since it was his wish to possess the sovereignty of Hellas.” This passage leads us to believe that Herodotus has some doubts on the story of Pausanias, though he does not give a full account of Pausanias’ actions in Byzantion. On the other hand, Thucydides (I.128.7) and Diodorus (XI.44.3) only tell that Pausanias offered to marry the daughter of Xerxes.

13 In spring of 479 B.C., Persian general, Mardonios tried through diplomacy to withdraw the Athenians from the Greek alliance and the Persian Wars by offering to rebuild their city, give large sums of money and establish them as the masters of Greece. The Athenians threatened to make peace with Persian if no aid came from Spartan. In the end, Spartans resolved to send an arm force against the Persians in accordance with the demands of Athenians, as they thought that when the Persians and the Athenians allied, they could easily destroy the wall which they recently built across the Isthmus. Herodotus, IX.6-9; Plutarch, Aristides, 10.4-5 ff. Plutarch also states that after the battle of Plataea, the Athenians did not agree to award the prize for valour to the Spartans, or allow them to put up a general trophy. The two sides may even have gone to war to settle their quarrel on this issue. Aristides, 20.1-5. Herodotus (IX.102.3) similarly states that during the battle of Mycale in summer of 479 B.C., the Athenians and the allies wished to make this their own victory, “not to share it with the Lacedaemonians”.
as the last battle of Persian Wars in 479 B.C. Pausanias took control of the Greek fleet in 478 B.C. After he captured Byzantium in the summer in order to prevent any future Persian advance from this passage between Asia and Europe, the power struggle between the two leading states appears to have reached a critical level. Seemingly a movement was started in Byzantium by the Ionians and those lately freed from the Persian king to transfer the leadership of the fleet from Sparta to Athens, which evidently led to a clash between Pausanias, and other Greeks in Byzantium, that is, the Athenians, Chians, Samians and Lesbians. The Ionian islanders were resentful against the Spartans and had already inclined to support the Athenians. Plutarch specifies on this matter by mentioning the commanders of the contingents of Chios, Samos and Lesbos in particular and also states a chapter in which Uliades of Samos and Antagoras of Chios with their supporters mutinied at Byzantium.

14 Plutarch (Aristides, 22; cf. Themistokles, 20) states that Themistokles proposed “to burn the naval station of the allied Greek fleet [when it was drawn up on the shore of Pegasae]: in this way Athens would become the most powerful state in Greece and could dominate the rest.” Although this wicked and at the same time profitable proposal was refused by the Assembly, there appears to have been a certain group of people in Athens who bitterly wished to see Athens as the leader of Hellas. At the same time, there was a move in Sparta to make war on Athens to recover the hegemony at sea, though this move was also rejected. Forrest, ibid., 100. After Mycale, in winter of 479 B.C, Greek fleet first sailed to the Hellespont to break up the Persian bridges under the Spartan commander, Leotychidas. Herodotus, IX.106.4; Thucydides, I.89.1-2. Seeing that the bridges had already been destroyed, Leotychidas and the Peloponnesians under him were anxious to sail back to Greece. However, the Athenian fleet remained and laid siege to Sestos, the main focus of the Persian resistance and the strongest and possibly the richest fortress in all that region (Herodotus, IX.115.1; 116.1-2; Xenophon, Hellenica, IV.8.5; Strabo, XIII.1.22; Strabo, VII 56; Ps. Skylax, 67; Polybius, XVI.29. 9 ) and with them were allies from the Hellespont, the Samians, Chians, Lesbians and other islanders. Herodotus, IX.106.7; 114.2, cf. Thucydides, I.89.2. Therefore, we see that the Athenians left the alliance in order to capture Sestos over which they had an ancestral claim, as this city had been settled by the Athenian colonists at the time of Pisistratus. Z.H. Archibald, The Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace: Orpheus Unmasked (Oxford, 1998), 113-114. It appears that Pausanias later on reacted against the same states in Byzantium, which had taken part in the capture of Sestos.

15 Demosthenes (LIX, 96-98) states that Pausanias was chosen as the supreme commander of the allied Greek fleet despite the leading role of the Athenians in securing the freedom for Greeks in the Persian Wars and the Athenians did not intend to struggle against the Spartans as rivals “through fear of arousing jealousy among the allies.”


17 Unlike the Spartans, the Athenians had supported them in the Ionian revolt of the early 490s. Herodotus, V.96 ff. Furthermore, after Mycale the Greeks held a debate at Samos over what was to be done in future. The Spartans, anxious not to be committed to the long-term defense of the Greeks of Asia, even suggested that the Ionians should be transported back to the mainland Greece and resettled. However, the Athenians objected to such a radical action. Herodotus, IX.106.
against Pausanias and sided with the Athenians.\textsuperscript{18} There are also several other passages which show that when Pausanias was in Byzantion, he was constantly upset and fearful of his enemies who were likely to be the other allies.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, it appears that the Athenians were ready to take the leadership back in Byzantion,\textsuperscript{20} which they had lost to Spartans unwillingly just before the invasion of Xerxes as mentioned above (p.2).

We do not think that before Pausanias sailed to Byzantion, he wanted to establish his self-rule over there. However, in view of the Athenians and her allies’ reaction in Byzantion as mentioned above, Pausanias may have been compelled to obtain the support of Persians first by releasing the Persian prisoners\textsuperscript{21} and eventually behave the allies reactively in order not to lose strategically important and rich city of Byzantion,\textsuperscript{22} which had happened in the case of Sestos (n.13). Given the Athenian support for the mainland Ionians right after the Persian Wars as mentioned above (n.15), Persian king’ support for Pausanias was comprehensible. Also a representative of Sparta’s more

\textsuperscript{18} Aristides, 23.5.
\textsuperscript{19} Pausanias, III.17.8; Plutarch, Cimon, VI.7.
\textsuperscript{20} Aristides seems to have been very enthusiastic in this respect. Diodorus, XI 44.6 and 46.4; Plutarch, Aristides, 23.4; Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, 23.4.
\textsuperscript{21} Thucydides, I.128.6-8. In fact, Diodorus (XI.44.3) states that when Pausanias first took Byzantion, he slew some of the barbarians and others were expelled. Also many important Persians were held as prisoners. These were the ones whom Pausanias released later on.
\textsuperscript{22} Pausanias must have been affected by the richness, strategic importance as well as the beauty of this city. It is argued that the strategic harbours like Sestos and Byzantion were regular centres of pay as harbour taxes, taken from the passing ships from Black Sea to the Aegean, and of maintenance for the Athenian fleet. A.French, “The tribute of the allies”, Historia 21 (1972), 8, 17. From the Athenian Tribute Lists, we see that Byzantion paid the highest tribute recorded for members anywhere with the exception of Thasos and Aegina: 15 T in 449 BC and 15.4300 in 422 and 441 BC; 15.0460 in 440 BC. R. Meiggs, ibid., 525-530. Byzantion also held a key point for the passage of goods between the Black Sea and Aegean in antiquity, as in more recent centuries. In other words, Byzantines were common benefactors of the necessities of life and superfluities such as cattle, slaves, honey, wax, salted fish and sometimes grain coming from the surroundings of the Black Sea. Polybius, IV, 38 ff.; Moreover, it was also a center of production, especially fish. D.Braund, “Fish from the Black Sea: Classical Byzantium and the Greekness of Trade”, Food in Antiquity, ed. J.Wilkins-D. Harvey-M. Dobson (Exeter, 1995), 162-170. For the attractive beauty of Byzantion, see Herodotus, IV.144.
monarchical regime can only have encouraged the Persian support. 23

Pausanias’ foreign connection with Persian king was eventually going to bring a considerable benefit to himself despite the fact that this made him vulnerable to attack at Sparta. His position was uncomfortable, as Persia was still the enemy and anti-Persian feeling must still have been strong among the Spartans. Despite this, holding Byzantion must also have suited to the interest of Sparta. After all, Byzantion was a Dorian colony. 24

The reasons which were given by Thucydides for the withdrawal of Spartan support for Pausanias in Byzantion do not seem to be satisfactory enough to explain the reluctance of Spartans to struggle over the leadership in Byzantion. 25 Pausanias must at the same time have realized that his country, Sparta, was not powerful enough on sea to support himself openly against the Athenians and her allies. 26 Especially holding a distant city like Byzantion in hand depended on strength at sea. When Pausanias was called back in 476 B.C

23 The Persian King could not be normally expected to form an alliance with Athens while Athens is a democracy. E.Hall, Inventing the Barbarian ( Oxford, 1989 ), 97-98. During the Peloponnesian War ( 431-405 B.C ), Athens and Sparta were struggling for Persian king’s friendship. However, throughout the war, Spartan diplomacy became more successful with regard to Persia. Especially the Persian military and financial support to the Spartans in the Hellespontine region, helped a great deal to the Spartans in defeating the Athenian navy at Aigospotamoi in 405 B.C. Thucydides, VIII.53.2-3; 68.4; Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1.13-14; Diodorus, XIII.104.4; Plutarch, Lysander, 9.2.

24 Byzantion had been established as a Dorian city around 680 B.C and possibly owned a great deal of Megarian population. Pausanias may have expected their support as well. We know that Megara regretted being involved in the Delian League and they massacred the Athenian garrison in their city around 446 B.C. Thucydides, I.114.1. Xenophon ( Hellenica, 1.1.36 ) states that especially the Megarians helped the Spartans to take Byzantion by manning fifteen ships during the Peloponnesian War, in 410 B.C. A racial split between the Dorians and the Ionians, that is between the descendants of Spartans and those of Athenians appears to have lasted during the fifth century B.C. See Thucydides, I.124.2, using a phrase, “Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians”. This split was also seen in the case of Athenian support for the mainland Ionians, as mentioned above ( n.16 ).

25 Thucydides ( I.95.6-7 ) states that the Spartans sent out Dorcis and certain others with a small force to Byzantion, but the other allies did not concede to them the supremacy. So, Spartans departed, as, apart from the fear of a similar moral deterioration of a successor to Pausanias, they no longer wanted to get involved in the Median War and were happy with the competency of the Athenians for the position of the leadership of Hellas, and with the Athenian friendship at the time towards themselves.

26 The Athenians had created the greatest fleet in Greece by 480 B.C. See B. Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period: A study of Athenian Naval Administration and Military Organization in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. ( London, 1972, 16-21 ). According to Herodotus ( VII.43.1; 44.1 ), there were 180 Athenian and 16 Spartan triremes in the Greek fleet before the sea-battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. Thus rather than confronting the Athenians for the supremacy at sea, the Spartan government chose to engage in extending her authority on land against the medising states of central and northern Greece, Boiotia and Thessaly and to focus on repairing her unsettled position inside the Peloponnesian League. Forrest, ibid., 99-100.
because of his alleged insolent conduct against the allies, he did not hesitate to go back to Sparta in spite of the fact that he could have continued his self-rule in Byzantion with the support of Persians. He possibly knew that some Spartans supported his actions as well, even though the Spartan government did not want to give him an open and official support due to the possibility of a far-spread war between Athens and Sparta and the anti-Persian atmosphere.

It is interesting that Pausanias was released when he was first recalled to Sparta. The accusations that he released some Persian prisoners and oppressed the Greek citizens were not convincing enough to keep him in prison at Sparta. The unwillingness of the Spartans to sentence him and let him go privately back to Byzantion again by a private ship after his so-called acquittal in Sparta could be due to the fact that the Spartans also had tacitly objected to the idea of transferring the leadership of the Greek alliance to the Athenians in Byzantion.

In fact, the Athenian and Spartan struggle over controlling Byzantion may have continued for a long time. Within this context, we need to focus on a passage in Justin. He writes that “for this city (Byzantion) was first founded by Pausanias, the king of the Spartans, and it was held (by him?) for seven years. Thereafter it was under the power of the Lacedaemonians or the Athenians according as either was victorious.”

27 Thucydides, I.128.5-7, 129.3.
28 Thucydides, I.128.2. Actually, a group of people in Sparta would have been happy to see Pausanias leaving Sparta and ruling in Byzantion out of jealousy of his fame after the victory over the Persians. He was a powerful person in Sparta and after his success at Plataea, in Cyprus as well as in Byzantion, he was capable of becoming even more so and appear to have acted accordingly. Nepos, Pausanias, 1.3 and 2.1-2. It is interesting to see that the other leading commander of the allies, Spartan King, Leotychidas was exiled at about the same time of the first recalling of Pausanias to Sparta in 476 B.C. Herodotus, VI.72 and Forrest, ibid., 100. We see that the people of Athens, after the Persian defeat, wished to ostracize Aristides “disguising their jealousy of his fame under the pretext that they were afraid of tyranny”. Plutarch, Aristides, 7.4. Aristides was ostracized in 482 B.C. However, since the Athenians were alarmed that he might go over to the enemy and seduce many of his fellow-citizens into joining the barbarians, the Athenians called him back and all the exiles in 480 B.C. Plutarch, Aristides, 8.1-2. Similarly the Spartans may have allowed Pausanias to leave Sparta despite the fact that they knew he will have collaborated with the Persians.

29 Plutarch (Aristides, 23.1) states that “the other Spartans commanders” also behaved to the Athenians and the other allies the same way as Pausanias after capturing Byzantion. On the other hand, Diodorus (XI.54.2) points out that the Spartans were eager to involve Athens in similar discreditable charges as brought against Pausanias in Byzantion by the other allies.
30 Justin, Epitoma, IX.1.3, written sometime in the Third century C.E.
31 For the English translation of this text, see C.W. Fornara, Archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War: Translated Documents of Greece and Rome (2 nd ed. ed. and trans., Cambridge, 1983), no.61, 60.
If we do not doubt this passage, it seems that Pausanias ruled Byzantion for seven years. This is not a short period. Persian support for Pausanias and its influence in the region must have been strong enough to keep Pausanias in power after his second arrival to Byzantion.

Pausanias can have taken Byzantion back with the support of the Persians when Cimon, having taken the command of allies along with Aristides after Pausanias’ first departure, set out for a naval expedition from Byzantion just before 476 B.C. A fragment of Ephorus or a writer using him and Diodorus mentions that Cimon moved from Byzantion with the allies. By concentrating on the liberation process against the Persians in accordance with the mood and purpose of the Delian League, Cimon first captured Eion, a Persian outpost in Europe, and then the island of Scyros, which were naturally rich and held strategic importance. The capture of Eion and Scyros may have been dated to 475 B.C.

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32 Thucydides, who writes an extended account ( 8 chapters ) about the rule of Pausanias in Byzantion, does not say a word concerning this seven years’ rule in Byzantion. His main concern, as he ( I.97.3 ) himself stresses, was to tell events containing “an explanation of the growth of the Athenian Empire.” So the downfall of Pausanias in Byzantion and its subsequent capture by the Athenians was an important part of the extension of the Athenian power. Thucydides concentrates on this popular Athenian view. Robertson, *ibid.*, 122-3. This fact may contrarily imply that the rule of Pausanias in Byzantion for seven years was actually one of the serious threat against the growth of the Athenian Empire, for Thucydides did not mention it.

33 The Athenians only controlled the cities on the coast by means of their huge fleet even at the height of their sea-power. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities*, I.32, as a late source, 7 B.C. It must even have been difficult for the Athenians to control these cities on the coast by her fleet all the time. They had to operate their fleet at sea all the time, which required a great deal of money and effort. Naturally after a certain operation, the navy must have returned to its base in Athens. Moreover, the cities in a distant region like Propontis, Hellespont and Bosphorus would easily have been attacked by the Persians or the barbarian tribes, who held the hinterland. Thucydides, I.129; Herodotus, III.120 and 126; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 4.1.15; III.1.10-18. For the threat of the surrounding tribes against Byzantion, see Polybius, IV.38 ff.; Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 6.2.1-2. Also see Meritt, *ibid.*, 117 ff.

34 Plutarch, *Aristides*, 23.1; Cimon, 6.1 and 6.3.

35 For the English translation of this fragment, see Fornara, *ibid.*, no.61, 60.

36 XI.60.2.

Plutarch states that Cimon eventually drove Pausanias out of Byzantion, possibly in 469 B.C.\textsuperscript{38} Pausanias’ final expulsion from Byzantion could be related to a confusing piece of evidence that Cimon captured Sestos a second time together with Byzantion in a single campaign.\textsuperscript{39} The capture of Sestos may have taken place right after Cimon took Byzantion from Pausanias in 469 B.C. A great number of Persian prisoners as well as barbarian prisoners fighting under the command of Persian were taken. The spoils consisted of the rich jewellery of the Persians. Therefore, during the period of seven years’ rule in Byzantion, the Persians along with the support of Pausanias appears to have taken Sestos back as well, as this place was an open target for a Persian attack from the Asia, where the Persian prevalence continued ( see n.32 ).

The cities, distant from the center of Athens or Sparta, would have easily changed hands with respect to the balance of power in their region. As mentioned above, according to Justin, even after the final capture of Byzantion by Cimon, he says that this city changed hands afterwards whoever became victorious over it either Spartans or the Athenians.\textsuperscript{40}

Having been discharged from Byzantion, Pausanias first withdrew to Colonae in the Troad and then agreed to return to Sparta.\textsuperscript{41} He possibly

\textsuperscript{38} Plutarch, \textit{Cimon}, 6.6. The Athenians and the allies must surely have felt confident enough to overthrow the rule of Pausanias in Byzantion right after the destruction of Persian navy in Eurymedon under the command of Cimon, which is usually dated to the early 460s, 469 or 466. Powell, \textit{ibid.}, 20. This defeat led to the the prolonged exclusion of the Persian navy from the Aegean. When Justin’s evidence with regard to Pausanias’ seven years’ rule in Byzantion is taken into consideration, we may suggest that Cimon took Byzantion back just after the Eurymedon in 469 B.C. For the date of the expulsion of Pausanias in 460s, see E.M. White, “Some Agiad dates: Pausanias and his sons”, \textit{JHS} 84 ( 1964 ), 140-52; P.J. Rhodes, “Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles”, \textit{Historia} 19 (1970 ), 396-7; E. Badian, “Towards a chronology of the \textit{Pentekontaetia} down to the renewal of the Peace of Callias”, \textit{Classical News and Views} 79 (1988 ), 300-4.

\textsuperscript{39} Plutarch, \textit{Cimon}, 9.

\textsuperscript{40} The Athenians had started to lose support among the cities within the Delian League in the early 460s, since they started to use the League for their own interests to create their own empire. For the tyrannical character of Athenian Imperialism, see Thucydides, I.24.3; VI.76; Aristophanes, \textit{Knights}, 1329 ff; cf.\textit{Acharnians} 6733ff; \textit{Wasps}, 1098-1101. Thucydides mentions that after the formation of the Delian League in 478 B.C, this alliance assumed the responsibility of undertaking war against “their own rebel allies, and against the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact with them on various occasions.” ( 1.97.1 ). He also ( 1.98.4-99.3 ) tells us the reasons why the allies later wanted to secede from the League. The revolt of Naxos was brutally suppressed by the Athenians in 469/8 B.C. Thucydides, I.98.4. We see that Athens made alliances with Sparta’s enemies, Thessaly and Argos, and encouraged to revive the anti-Spartan feeling around 465 B.C. Forrest, \textit{ibid.}, 102-103. Therefore, under the circumstances of anti-Athenian feeling in the early 460s, the Spartans could easily have taken an open action against the Athenians in order to hold Byzantion.

\textsuperscript{41} Thucydides, I.131.1.
believed that the Spartan government was not going to charge him on Medism. Although first put into prison, and he was afterwards released without any clear reason. The Spartans insisted on finding an indisputable evidence on the charge of Medism.\textsuperscript{42} Actually the real cause of charging such a prominent man in the end may result from the fact that he was unhappy with the established constitution and aimed at tyranny by planning a Helot insurrection in Sparta against the \textit{ephoralty}.\textsuperscript{43} It is possible that he was finally convicted for this charge, took refuge in the temple of Athena of the Brazen House, and starved to death in there.\textsuperscript{44}

**CONCLUSION**

There was an ongoing struggle between Athens and Sparta over the leadership of \textit{Hellas}. Although Thucydides states that Pausanias was called back from Byzantion to Sparta twice and tried on the grounds of his unwarranted behaviors, he may have been compelled to react against Athens and the other allies in Byzantion and consequently to take the support of the Persians when he felt that the Athenians and her allies had had the intention of taking both the leadership of Greek Alliance and Byzantion from his hands. In the face of Athenian naval supremacy and anti-Persian feelings right after the Persian Wars, Sparta could not have directly supported Pausanias’ actions, though winked at his actions. Not having the open support of Sparta, Pausanias appears to have taken Byzantion back and continued his rule over there for seven years with the help of Persians which still continued to hold its influence around the Hellespontine region. However, it is possible that after the Eurymedon defeat of Persians both in land and at sea in the early 460s or in 469, Pausanias’ position in Byzantion weakened and the Athenian general, Cimon, took the opportunity to depose Pausanias from Byzantion. In spite of this, Sparta appears to have directly and continuously quarreled against Athens over the control of Byzantion after the early 460 s, for the popularity of Athenians in the Delian League as well as the anti-Persian feelings began to decline during this period.

\textsuperscript{42} Thucydides, I.132.1.
\textsuperscript{43} Thucydides, I.132.5; Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, 5.1.1301b; 5.7.1307a; 7.14.1333b; Pausanias, II.9.1; Nepos, \textit{Pausanias}, 3.6.
\textsuperscript{44} The date of his death has not been determined, but probably corresponds to around 470 B.C. See Powell, \textit{ibid.}, 106 and B.C. F. Lasserre in \textit{Der Kleine Pauly}, 1979, Band 4, col.569.
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